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INTRODUCTION
In their recent article, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate,1 Professors Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Robert E.
Scott identify a phenomenon found in standardized contracts they
describe as “contractual black holes.”2 The concept of black holes
comes from theoretical physics. Under the original hypothesis, the
gravitational pull of a black hole is so strong that once light or
information is pulled past an event horizon into a black hole, it cannot
escape.3 In recent years, the thesis has been reformulated such that the
current thesis is that some information can escape, but it is so degraded
that it is virtually useless.4 In their article, Choi, Gulati, and Scott apply
the black hole concept to certain standardized contractual boilerplate
provisions.
A contractual black hole is “a boilerplate term that is reused for
decades and without reflection merely because it is part of a standard
form package of terms, [and is thereby] emptied of any recoverable
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1. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 3 n.2.
4. Id.
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meaning.”5 Closely related to contractual black holes are “contractual
grey holes.”6 A contractual grey hole is a meaningless variation of a
boilerplate term that has been repeatedly reused over a long period of
time such that it “has lost much (but not necessarily all) meaning.”7 In
short, contractual black holes lack any meaning, while contractual grey
holes may still contain some meaning, but there is no basis for making
a legal distinction between the variations in the language that have
appeared over time.8
Although their article focuses on pari passu clauses in sovereign
debt contracts, Choi, Gulati, and Scott note that “[i]nsurance contracts
appear to be another area with the potential for such terms.”9 They are
correct.
Insurance policies are the grandparents of contractual black holes.
Insurance traces its origins to 2250 B.C. when Babylonian maritime
traders entered “bottomry” contracts, in which a party loaned money
to a shipper with the understanding that the money would not be
repaid if the ship sank or was pirated.10 Bottomry contracts eventually
evolved into modern insurance and Lloyd’s of London issued the first
maritime insurance policies in the 1600s.11 Almost 100 years ago,
insurance policies were the first type of standardized agreement to be
called “contracts of adhesion.”12 Through rote re-usage, many of the
terms and conditions contained in insurance policies sold today have
been in use for decades.13 The continual reuse of antiquated policy
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 4 n.3. This Essay refers to both contractual black and grey holes as contractual
black holes despite the minor difference between the two.
9. Id. at 7 n.16 (citing Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as
Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial
Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2017)).
10. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 16 (5th ed. 2012) (noting the earliest traces of risk transference resembling
insurance can be found within ancient Babylonian society).
11. Id. at 16–17.
12. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky
Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 129, 131 (2012) (citing Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery
of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (describing standardized life
insurance policies as contracts of adhesion)).
13. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOBBYN & CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH, INSURANCE LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 64 (5th ed. 2015) (“[M]any of the terms and conditions contained in standard form
policies were drafted many years ago and are reused each time a new version of the policy form
is issued.”); DONALD S. MALECKI & DAVID D. THAMANN, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
COVERAGE GUIDE 363-662 (11th ed. 2015) (reproducing the various iterations of the Insurance
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language is, in part, due to the frequent application of a strict liability
version of contra proferentem to the interpretation of insurance
policies.14 Thus, because changing the policy language could be viewed
as an admission that the prior language was ambiguous or because the
existing language already has been held to be unambiguous, insurers
are naturally reluctant to change policy language that has already been
interpreted by courts.
Consequently, insurance policies are particularly susceptible to
the formation of contractual black holes. Indeed, some courts view
insurance policies as massive contractual black holes from which only
a few flashes of light (i.e., meaning) escape.15 To test the hypothesis
that insurance policies contain, or even embody, contractual black
holes, this Essay considers four provisions found in commercial
insurance policies: 1) “Sue and Labor” Clauses, 2) “Ensuing Loss”
Clauses, 3) “Non-Cumulation” Clauses, and 4) the “Sudden and

Services Office, Inc.’s standard Commercial General Liability policy form that have been used
for the past 40 years, which reveals the various iterations of the policies contain many provisions
that are identical or substantially similar); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The
Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2006) (arguing that the
predictability in the interpretation of policy language by courts incentivizes not changing policy
language); see also Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other Insurance”
Clause by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375, 388 (2011) [hereinafter French, “NonCumulation Clause”] (discussing the transfer of the language contained in the non-cumulation
clause drafted in 1960 to the 1971 version of the policy that is still found in some policies today).
14. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV.
531, 538 (1996) (“The strict liability approach to ambiguity is the principal feature of the hornbook
statement of contra proferentem . . . . If a policy provision is ‘ambiguous’—reasonably susceptible
to more than one interpretation by the ordinary reader of the policy—then the . . . interpretation
more favorable to the insured governs . . . .”); Boardman, supra note 13, at 1113; French, supra
note 9, at 557–58 (“Unlike in typical contract disputes where contra proferentem [is] a tiebreaker
when ambiguous policy language cannot be conclusively clarified by extrinsic evidence, most
courts simply construe any ambiguities in the policy language against the insurer and in favor of
coverage. [Thus,] contra proferentem . . . in insurance cases has been described as strict liability
for the insurer.” (footnotes omitted)).
15. Although they do not use the term “contractual black hole,” some courts have described
insurance policies as “incomprehensible” and “a mere flood of darkness and confusion.” See, e.g.,
Storms v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978) (“[I]nsurance policies [contain
such] complex verbiage that ‘they would not be understood by men in general, even if [the policies
were] subjected to a careful and laborious study. . . . [The policy] would, unless he were an
extraordinary man, be an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confusion.’” (second
alteration in original) (third DeLancy v. Rockingham Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 581,
587–88 (N.H. 1873))); S.C. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 489 S.E.2d 200, 206 (S.C.
1997) (“Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite tools of the insurance trade
in drafting policies. Most are a virtually impenetrable thicket of incomprehensible verbosity.”
(quoting Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Ky. Ct. App.
1970))).
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Accidental” Pollution Exclusion. These four policy provisions are
suitable subjects because they either have generated significant
amounts of litigation with inconsistent court rulings or they are facially
complex or confusing. An examination of these provisions
demonstrates that the hypothesis that insurance policies house many
contractual black holes is both confirmed and refuted. Some policy
provisions have become contractual black holes, some provisions are
only apparent contractual black holes,16 and some provisions, while on
their way to becoming contractual black holes, were saved before their
original meaning crossed the event horizon. To understand this
conclusion, this Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I explores how the
insurance policy drafting process results in the rote reuse of policy
language. Part II considers the origins and purposes of the four
provisions at issue, and then analyzes whether each provision has
become a black hole.
I. THE DRAFTING AND ROTE REUSE OF INSURANCE POLICY
LANGUAGE
Insurance policies are complex financial instruments drafted by
insurers and then sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.17 An insurance
organization called the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) drafts
many of the commonly used policy forms and then seeks to have the
forms approved by state insurance commissioners.18 Insurers pay fees
16. “Apparent contractual black holes,” as the phrase is used in this Essay, are provisions
that do not appear to have meaning, but a consensus regarding their meaning can be found in case
law.
17. See, e.g., 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERICK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE § 4.06[b], at 4–65 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. Supp. 2017) (“In a sense, the
typical insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely
standardized and not even reviewed prior to contract formation.”); Michelle Boardman, Insuring
Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing the
“hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance,
14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide
identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle,
76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are
standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain
around.”).
18. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (“[A]n association
of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers[, ISO] is the almost exclusive
source of support services in this country for CGL insurance. ISO develops standard policy
forms . . . ; most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on these forms.” (citation
omitted)); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007) (“The Insurance
Services Office, Inc., also known as ISO, is an industry organization that promulgates various
standard insurance policies that are utilized by insurers throughout the country . . . .”).
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for ISO membership, which allows them to use the policy forms drafted
by ISO.19
Much of the policy language used in ISO’s standard forms was
written decades ago, but ISO continues to recycle the same language
in subsequent versions of its policies.20 For example, ISO’s 1973
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy form defines
“occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured.”21 Forty years later, ISO’s 2013 CGL policy form still defines
“occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”22
Despite being issued 40 years apart, both versions use the phrase “an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure.” The minor
variation in the wording of the phrases is an example of what Choi,
Gulati, and Scott describe as “encrustation,” where minor changes in
language do not really affect its legal meaning.23 Notably, even though
the meaning of the term “accident” has been litigated over and over
again for decades, which has produced an array of different court
interpretations of the term, ISO has never bothered to define the term
in CGL policies.24
When it comes to seeking guidance regarding the intent of the
drafters, the original drafters typically cannot be called upon to shed

19. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION 36–37 (6th ed. 2015).
20. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
21. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Definitions (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 363.
22. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Definition No. 13 (2013), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at
617. The “expected or intended” language contained in the definition of “occurrence” in the 1973
policy was moved to the exclusions section of the policy form in 2013: “This insurance does not
apply to . . . ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured.” Id. at 604 (Exclusion 2.a).
23. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 5.
24. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1998)
(“The difficulty in precisely defining the scope of coverage in liability policies providing coverage
for ‘accidents’ is not a problem of recent vintage. As Judge Van Nortwick observed . . . few
insurance policy terms have ‘provoked more controversy in litigation than the word “accident.”’”
(quoting CTC Dev. Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 704 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997)
(Van Nortwick, J., concurring))).
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light on the meaning of antiquated policy language.25 They are often
unidentifiable or have died during the many years that have elapsed
since they drafted the policy language.26
Documentation regarding the drafters’ intent is also often
unavailable.27 The lack of documentation may be intentional by
insurers because, as a result of the use of a strict liability version of
contra proferetem with respect to ambiguities in insurance policies,
insurers always take the position that the policy language is
unambiguous.28 If the language is unambiguous, then no extrinsic
evidence is needed or used to interpret it. Consequently, ISO and
insurers have a good reason not to preserve documentation of intent.
Insurance law essentially dictates this result. Unlike typical
contract disputes in which extrinsic evidence regarding the parties’
mutual intent is admissible to resolve disputes regarding ambiguous
contract language, there is no mutual intent to discern with respect to
insurance policies. Policyholders play no role in the drafting of
insurance policies and they do not even get a copy of the policies until
after purchasing them.29 Even the insurers selling the policies typically
do not know the intent of policy language because they did not draft
it.30 Thus, because any finding of ambiguity in the policy language
almost automatically means the insurer loses, policy language can
never be ambiguous from the insurer’s perspective once a coverage
dispute arises.

25. See e.g., DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 13, at 64; see also French, “Non-Cumulation
Clause,” supra note 13, at 386–89. In an attempt to understand the original drafter’s intent, the
author relied upon the deposition testimony of an insurance policy drafter, who incorporated
earlier policy language into a new policy form, regarding the original drafter’s intent because the
original drafter was dead. See id.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 13, at 64 (“Documentation regarding the intent
of the drafters also rarely exists. Consequently, it often is impossible to discern the original intent
of the drafters of standard form policy language.”); French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note
13, at 386–89 (relying upon secondhand deposition testimony to understand the drafter’s intent
regarding the non-cumulation clause because of a lack of documentary evidence).
28. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. See Boardman, supra note 13, at 1120; French, supra note 9, at 537, 548 (citing Eugene
R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively
Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 363 (1998)).
30. See supra notes 18–20, 25–26 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Employees regularly using a form often
have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary them.”); Anderson &
Fournier, supra note 29, at 364.
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Another disincentive to redrafting and modernizing policy
language is that doing so could be viewed as an admission that the older
policy language is either unclear or actually covers the types of losses
the insurer has been contending it does not.31 Thus, redrafting and
modernizing the language could lead to insurers losing future cases
decided under the older policy language. This leads to the rote reuse of
the same policy language decade after decade.
Some scholars also have theorized that insurers are reluctant to
redraft old policy language because their actuarial data, and thus
premiums, are based upon the language already in use.32 This argument
has intuitive appeal, but it may not be empirically correct. Premiums
generally are based upon broad factors, such as the nature of the
policyholder’s business, the size of the policyholder’s operations, the
policyholder’s number of employees, the policyholder’s gross revenues
or sales, and the policyholder’s loss history, rather than the granular
language of specific policy provisions.33 With that said, however,
insurers routinely add exclusions for certain types of losses they do not
want to cover if courts begin to interpret their policies to provide such
coverage.34 So, the idea that insurers have an incentive not to make

31. See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Blank, Black, and Grey Holes in Insurance Contracts 17
(Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Boardman%20
Black%20Holes%20in%20Insurance%20Contracts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2N9Z-8CEN]
(“[I]nsurers are generally unwilling to add specific exclusions in future policies if their position is
that the previous policies did not cover the loss either.”).
32. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“Changing contract language may require letting go of, or weakening
the predictive power of, valuable actuarial data.”); see also Boardman, supra note 13, at 1116
(“[T]he cost of each clause becomes increasingly clear as actuarial data is collected and pooled.”).
33. See, e.g., What Goes into the Price of a General Liability Insurance Policy for Small
Businesses?, INSUREON BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.insureon.com/blog/post/2014/03/12/
general-liability-price-factors.aspx [https://perma.cc/9LH9-UJWK] (listing the 8 factors that
determine premium rates as: 1) “Size and Condition of Your Business Premises, 2) “Type of
Business Operations/Industry,” 3) “Experience in Your Profession, Field, or Business,” 4)
Number of Employees,” 5) “Location of Your Business,” 6) “Limits and Deductibles,” 7) “Policy
Features,” and 8) “Claims History”); see also Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 226 F. Supp.
3d 537, 542 (W.D.N.C. 2017) (“[The insurer] calculated the final premium (i.e. price) charged to
[the policyholder] for CGL insurance provided under the [insurer’s] policies based on [the
policyholder’s] payroll on all of [the policyholder’s] operations. . . .”); Monkey Ridge, LLC v.
Unigard Ins. Co., No. 2:16-CV-0213, 2016 WL 5864428, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 6, 2016) (“[The
insurer] calculated the premiums due on the CGL Policy part of the Primary Policy and the
Umbrella Policy based on the number of properties identified and the acreage of those
properties.”); Essex Ins. Co. v. Ragland Mills, Inc., No. 06-0737-CV-W, 2008 WL 351014, at *8
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2008) (“This premium was calculated based upon the hazards and gross receipts
of elevator inspection.”).
34. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management,
17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1096–1114 (2015) (discussing insurers’ additions of exclusions for
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dramatic changes to policy language may have some merit even if the
specific wording of individual policy provisions is not part of the
premium calculation.
Finally, the meaning of certain provisions in policies also has been
obfuscated by the incredibly complex structure of policies that has
developed over time. Consider, for example, ISO’s 2013 CGL policy
form. When originally conceived and created, the CGL policy form was
the broadest form of liability coverage available under which the
insurer agreed to pay “all sums” for which the policyholder became
liable for “bodily injuries” or “property damage” caused by an
accident.35 One might expect a policy providing such broad coverage to
be a simple, short document. That would be a mistake. The 2013 CGL
policy form contains: three sections setting forth the different types of
coverage provided, thirty-eight exclusions, nine conditions, and
twenty-two definitions (not including the two pages it takes to explain
who is an “insured” under the policy).36
In sum, the antiquated insurance policy language reused decade
after decade, combined with the increasing length and complex
organization of the numerous terms, conditions, and exclusions that are
cross-referenced throughout, is a recipe for the development of
contractual black holes.37 The next Part tests this hypothesis by
considering four policy provisions found in commercial insurance
policies.

pollution claims, asbestos claims, terrorism claims, Y2K claims, and mold claims after losses
associated with such claims began to materialize).
35. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and
Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 358 (2006). Notably, when the
CGL policy form was first introduced in the 1940s it was called “Comprehensive General
Liability” insurance. ISO reduced the coverage provided under CGL policies by adding more and
more exclusions to the policy form over the decades and renamed the policy “Commercial
General Liability” insurance in 1986, but retained the CGL acronym. Id. at 355.
36. See MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 603–18.
37. See Boardman, supra note 17, at 1119 (“It is not just the language of insurance policies
that makes for difficult reading. The order of the language, the parachronistic structure of the
policy, and the intimate connection between clauses found in separate ‘sections’ pages apart,
[make the policy difficult to understand. Thus,] consumer[s] . . . often miss . . . controlling
clauses.”).
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II. EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL CONTRACTUAL BLACK HOLES IN
INSURANCE POLICIES
A. Non-Cumulation Clauses
The first candidate for contractual black hole status is the NonCumulation Clause that appears in CGL policies. Non-Cumulation
Clauses are implicated when a loss triggers multiple policy periods, and
courts and parties must figure out which of the triggered policies are
liable and for how much.38 Non-Cumulation Clauses are a prime
example of a policy provision that was first drafted decades ago and,
through rote reuse, has lost its meaning when interpreted and applied
in current disputes.
The Lloyd’s of London Non-Cumulation Clause, which is the
earliest one used in modern occurrence-based insurance policies, was
first created in 1960 by Leslie R. Dew and his fellow London
underwriters.39 The clause originally read as follows:
C. PRIOR INSURANCE AND NON CUMULATION OF
LIABILITY
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in
whole or in part under any other policy issued to the Assured prior to
the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon as stated in item
2 of the Declarations shall be reduced by any amounts due to the
Assured on account of such loss under such prior policy insurance.
Subject to the foregoing paragraph and to all the other terms and
conditions of this policy in the event that personal injury or property
damage arising out of an occurrence covered hereunder is continuing
at the time of termination of this policy Underwriters will continue to
protect the Assured for liability in respect of such personal injury or
property damage without payment of additional premium.40

Prior to 1960 when Lloyd’s of London created the first version of
modern “occurrence”-based CGL policies, which is the type of CGL
policy form most commonly used today, CGL policies were “accident”based.41 Under accident-based CGL policies, the coverage-triggering

38. See French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 375–77.
39. See id. at 386.
40. Id. (quoting Randolph M. Fields, The Underwriting of Unlimited Risk: The London
Market Umbrella Liability Policy 1950 to 1970, Morgan Owen Medal Essay Submission to the
Chartered Insurance Institute (1994) (Exhibit 16) (LRD 60 Form Policy, Condition C)).
41. Id. at 387; Stempel, supra note 35, at 363.
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event was an “accident” that gave rise to an injury.42 The policies did
not define the term “accident.” Consequently, courts had to determine
what “accident” meant as it was used in the policies.43 The case law was
developing such that some courts had concluded that accidents were
not limited in time and space to a single event, but rather, could include
situations that took place over longer periods of time and caused
ongoing injuries.44 Consequently, in 1960, the CGL policy form was
revised to use a defined term of “occurrence” instead of just the
undefined term “accident.”45
By changing to occurrence-based insurance, the coverage
triggering event became an “occurrence,” which originally was defined
as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”46
Significantly, this change to an occurrence-triggering policy form
meant coverage was expressly provided not only for individual injurycausing events, but also for gradual injury-causing situations that could
span long periods of time. As one insurer representative in the 1960s
explained:
The definition [of “occurrence”] embraces an injurious exposure to
conditions which results in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary that
the event causing the injury be sudden in character. In most cases, the
injury will be simultaneous with the exposure. However, in some
other cases, injuries will take place over a long period of time before
they become manifest. The slow ingestion of foreign matters and
inhalation of noxious fumes are examples of injuries of this kind. The
definition serves to identify the time of loss for application of
coverage in these cases, viz, the injury must take place during the
policy period. This means that in exposure-type cases, cases involving

42. French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387.
43. Stempel, supra note 35, at 363–64.
44. See, e.g., Shipman v. Emp’rs. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 125 S.E.2d 72, 75–76 (Ga. Ct. App.
1962) (explaining that an “accident” may take place over time).
45. See, e.g., French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387; Stempel, supra note
35, at 364; John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS. COUNS.
J. 223, 223 (1966) (“The principal reason given for revision of the [the policy form] was adverse
court decisions.”).
46. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Definitions (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 363.
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cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may come into
play in determining coverage and its extent under each policy.47

This extension of coverage created a problem for insurers because
some injuries simultaneously could be covered under both the older
accident-based policies and the new occurrence-based policies.48 For
example, in situations where a court could conclude the coverage
triggering “accident” under accident-based policies was the defective
manufacture of a product that subsequently caused an injury, under the
occurrence-based policies the injuries themselves were the triggering
event.49 This meant the policyholder could recover under both policy
forms for the same injury and potentially receive a double recovery.50
The Non-Cumulation Clause was created to address that problem by
preventing the policyholder from receiving a windfall double
recovery.51
Non-Cumulation Clauses became contractual black holes,
however, when they continued to be reused decade after decade with
only minor variations despite the dramatically changing legal and
scientific landscape. At the time the clause was originally drafted in
1960, the drafters did not conceive of “long-tail” claims such as the
asbestos and environmental claims that later arose in the 1970s through
1990s when the delayed manifestation of the injury-causing effects of
asbestos exposure became more widely understood and environmental
laws were passed that created retroactive strict liability for past waste
generators, haulers, and disposers.52 Nor did, or could, the original
drafters intend the clause to apply to such claims.53 The clause was
designed to prevent double recoveries, not to limit recoveries for
unforeseen long-tail claims.54
When you attempt to apply Non-Cumulation Clauses to modern
long-tail claims, where the injury is continuously caused over many
years, a contractual black hole appears. The clause reads, in part:
47. Stempel, supra note 35, at 368 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Norman Nachman, The New
Policy Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 10 CPCU ANNALS 196, 199–200 (1965)).
Nachman was the manager of casualty insurance and multiple lines insurance at the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, a predecessor to ISO.
48. See French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 387–88.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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[I]f any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole or in part
under any other policy issued to the Assured prior to the inception
date hereof the limit of liability hereon . . . shall be reduced by any
amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss under such prior
policy insurance.55

The policy language does not specify how to determine whether a loss
is “covered” under a prior-incepting policy or who makes the
determination. Nor does it state whether a court judgment is necessary.
It also does not address whether the prior insurer needs to admit
liability in order to trigger the clause’s application.
Further, it is unclear what constitutes an “amount due” under
prior insurance. It could be an amount that a court has adjudicated is
due. Or, it could simply be an amount that a subsequent insurer who is
attempting to avoid liability merely alleges is due from another insurer
that issued a policy in an earlier policy year. Arguably, it should at least
be an amount actually paid by a prior insurer for the loss, but the policy
does not state that.
In addition, the clause is silent regarding how one should deal with
settlements in which a prior incepting insurer denies liability but settles
nonetheless. The clause simply does not address whether settlement
payments are “amounts due” under a Non-Cumulation Clause. Nor
does it state whether later incepting insurance policies get credit for the
actual settlement amounts paid or for the full limits of the policies
issued by the prior incepting policy. As these examples indicate, NonCumulation Clauses become contractual black holes when they are
applied to long-tail claims today.
B. Sue and Labor Clauses
The second candidate for contractual black hole status is the Sue
and Labor Clause.56 Sue and Labor Clauses originated in Lloyd’s of
London’s marine insurance policies in the 1600s.57 A common version
of a Sue and Labor Clause provides:
And in case of any Loss o[r] Misfortune, it shall be lawful and
necessary for the Assured . . . to sue, labor and travel for, in, and about
the defense, safeguard and recovery of the Vessel, or any part thereof,

55. French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 386.
56. See generally Boardman, supra note 31, at 7–8 (describing the origins and history of Sue
and Labor Clauses and considering whether they are contractual black holes).
57. Id. at 7.
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without prejudice to this insurance, to the charges whereof the
Underwriters will contribute their proportion as provided below. . . .
In the event of expenditure under the Sue and Labor clause, the
Underwriters shall pay the proportion of such expenses that the
amount insured hereunder bears to the Agreed Value, or that amount
insured hereunder (less loss and/or damage payable under this Policy)
bears to the actual value of the salved property, whichever proportion
shall be less. . . .58

The phrase to “sue, labor and travel for,” or some variation of it, has
been used in marine policies for approximately 400 years.59 The phrase
also has been transferred to other types of insurance and is now found
in inland property policies.60
What does it mean “to sue, labor and travel for, in, and about the
defense, safeguard and recovery of the [the property], or any part
thereof?” If you own a ship, on what occasion would you have to “sue,
labor and travel” to defend or safeguard the ship? Today, the phrase is
basically meaningless to most people. The phrase appears to have the
qualities of a contractual black hole.
With that said, the Sue and Labor Clause is only an apparent
contractual black hole. Although it has been replicated in insurance
policies for hundreds of years and appears to be gibberish on its face,
the clause has not lost its meaning over time. Courts and insurers know
what it means because its meaning and purpose have been preserved
through case law. The clause provides coverage to the policyholder for
the costs the policyholder incurs in an attempt to avoid or minimize an
occurring or impending loss.61 In short, it is a loss mitigation clause.62
The odd language used in the clause is a reflection of the times and
circumstances surrounding its original creation. A ship at sea in the
58. Ocean Towing Co. da Venezeula v. Cont’l Ins. Co., No. 89-2819, 1992 WL 40788, at *6
(E.D. La. Feb. 27, 1992).
59. See Boardman, supra note 31, at 8.
60. See id.
61. See id.; see also BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 21.02[e], at 1739 (18th ed. 2017).
62. See, e.g., Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, 894 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Sue and
labor expenses are sums spent by the assured in an effort to mitigate damages and loss. ‘The
purpose of the sue and labor clause [in an insurance contract] is to reimburse the insured for those
expenditures which are made primarily for the benefit of the insurer . . . .’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Blasser Bros., v. N. Pan–Am. Line, 628 F.2d 376, 386 (5th Cir.1980))); Armada Supply
Inc. v. Wright, 858 F.2d 842, 853 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Sue and labor expenses are those reasonable
costs borne by the assured to mitigate the loss and thus reduce the amount to be paid by the
underwriter.”).
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1600s that encountered a storm or pirates was allowed to do anything
and everything it could to preserve its cargo and the ship. And, it was
allowed to recover from the insurer the costs associated with doing so,
including the “labor” costs incurred and the costs associated with
“suing” anyone who had salvaged the damaged ship or goods.63 For
most ship owners today, fending off pirates is not as much of problem
as it was 400 years ago.
The subsequent transfer of the clause from marine insurance
policies to inland property policies without significant revision only
heightens the potential contractual black hole quality of the clause
because most property owners do not need to worry about fending off
pirates or jettisoning cargo during a storm to save property that is on
land. Indeed, on its face, the language makes little sense in that context.
So, could insurers update the language to make it more understandable
and relevant to the circumstances policyholders face today that could
result in losses? Absolutely, but that does not mean the language has
completely lost its meaning due to rote reuse over the centuries. There
is plenty of case law preserving its meaning despite the dated and
awkward wording.64 So, Sue and Labor Clauses should be viewed as
only apparent, not real, contractual black holes.
C. Ensuing Loss Clauses
The third candidate for contractual black hole status is the
Ensuing Loss Clause that appears in property policies—both
homeowners and commercial. Many property policies sold today are
“all risk” policies, which means they cover any and all losses unless the
peril causing the loss is specifically excluded.65 Insurers have added
exclusions to such policies to avoid covering certain perils such as
earthquakes and floods.66 In addition to specific earthquake and flood
63. See Boardman, supra note 31, at 8.
64. See supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from
Their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In an ‘allrisk’ policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered. This is the broadest form of
coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.” (footnote omitted)).
66. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. HO 00 03 05 11, Exclusion A.2 (2010),
reprinted in ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 19, at 197 (excluding coverage for “loss caused
directly or indirectly by . . . [e]arthquake . . . ” and “flood”); Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP
10 20 06 07, Commercial Property Broad Form, Exclusion (b) (2007), reprinted in BRUCE J.
HILLMAN, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY, 404–05 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that commercial all risk
property policies exclude coverage “for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [an]
[e]arthquake, including any earth sinking, rising or shifting related to such event”); Christopher
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exclusions, insurers also often include “anti-concurrent causation”
exclusions in their policies.67 Anti-concurrent causation exclusions
purport to exclude coverage for losses caused in any part by an
excluded peril: “This policy does not insure loss or damage caused
directly or indirectly by any Peril excluded.”68 Thus, under one literal
reading of an anti-concurrent causation exclusion, if an excluded peril
plays any role in causing a loss, then the loss arguably is not covered.
The potential for a contractual black hole to develop in this area
of insurance arises because policies with anti-concurrent causation
(and other) exclusions also often contain an exception to such
exclusions known in the insurance world as an Ensuing Loss Clause.69
Ensuing Loss Clauses have been in existence since the early 1900s
when they were created following the 1906 San Francisco fire. Several
courts refused to enforce anti-concurrent causation exclusions that
purported to exclude coverage for fire damage—a covered peril—that
resulted when gas lines were broken by an earthquake—an excluded
peril.70
One example of an Ensuing Loss Clause provides: “We insure for
all risks of physical loss to the property described in Coverage A except
for loss caused by: [any of the 6 following excluded perils]. Any ensuing
loss from items 1 through 6 not excluded is covered.”71 Like the term
“accident,” insurers have chosen not to define the term “ensuing loss”
in their policies. Readers must thus go to other sources to attempt to
understand it. A standard dictionary defines “ensue” as: “1. to come
afterward; follow immediately” or “2. to happen as a consequence;
result.”72 In other words, the Ensuing Loss Clause reinstates coverage
for losses that follow as a result of, at least in part, a covered peril even
if an excluded peril is also part of the causation chain, notwithstanding
the presence of an anti-concurrent causation exclusion. The confusing,
and apparently contradictory, language in Ensuing Loss Clauses
C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and Devastating Natural Catastrophes in America,
60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 61 (2015) (“Almost uniformly, [insurers] have refused to insure flood losses
for non-commercial entities despite selling ‘all risk’ homeowners property policies.”).
67. See Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The
Forgotten and Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J.
215, 216 (2012).
68. Blaine Constr. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting
insurance policy at issue).
69. See French, supra note 67, at 217.
70. See id. at 216–17.
71. Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
72. Ensue, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2014).
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combined with inconsistent anti-concurrent causation exclusions
creates the right setting for the formation of a contractual black hole.
Indeed, on its face, an Ensuing Loss Clause is a contractual black
hole. The wording alone allows almost no light into the meaning for
the reader. In a world where every loss is caused by numerous events,
how can a loss that is “caused directly or indirectly by any Peril
excluded” be excluded from coverage under an anti-concurrent
exclusion,73 while simultaneously be covered under an Ensuing Loss
Clause? From this contractual black hole, courts are left with the
fruitless task of divining meaning.
Not surprisingly, Ensuing Loss Clauses have flummoxed courts.74
In determining coverage, some courts simply default to the “efficient
proximate cause” doctrine to determine whether a covered or an
excluded peril is the first or dominant cause of the loss.75 Other courts
look at whether there was a separate and intervening covered peril that
caused the loss.76 And other courts simply analyze whether a covered
peril played any role in causing the loss.77 If it did, then there is
coverage. Interestingly, despite the inconsistency between anticoncurrent causation exclusions and Ensuing Loss Clauses, many
courts have held that Ensuing Loss Clauses are unambiguous and, by
implication, not contractual black holes. Courts have reached such
73. Blaine Constr. Corp., 171 F.3d at 346 (quoting insurance policy at issue).
74. See French, supra note 67, at 228–34 (collecting cases).
75. As one court stated:
The efficient proximate cause rule operates as an interpretive tool to establish coverage
when a covered peril “sets other causes into motion which, in an unbroken sequence,
produce the result for which recovery is sought.” The opposite proposition, however,
is not a rule of law. When an excluded peril sets in motion a causal chain that includes
covered perils, the efficient proximate cause rule does not mandate exclusion of the
loss. “[T]he efficient proximate cause rule operates in favor of coverage. A converse
rule would, of course, operate in favor of no coverage. . . . Because policies should
normally be construed in favor of coverage, because there is no settled law favoring
this argument, contrary to the insurer’s claim, and because the insurer does not offer
any further justification or authority supporting such a rule, we decline to adopt the
rule urged by the insurer.”
Vision One, LLC v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 300, 309 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (first quoting
McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Wash. 1992) (en banc); then
quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna (Cigna) Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 201, 206 (Wash.
1994) (en banc)).
76. See, e.g., Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 167–68 (Fla. 2003)
(holding that the repair of structural deficiencies due to design defects was not an ensuing loss
because there was no property damage separate from the defects themselves).
77. See, e.g., Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Ariz. 1985) (en
banc) (holding that damages caused by bees, an excluded peril, were covered due to an ensuing
loss provision because the damage caused by honey leaking from the bees’ hive “ensued”—
resulted—after the bees had been exterminated).
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conclusions even though they have interpreted the clauses
inconsistently and made inconsistent coverage determinations when
applying them.78
In sum, the Ensuing Loss Clause is a better candidate for
contractual black hole status than the Sue and Labor Clause. Although
the origin of the Ensuing Loss Clause is known, unlike the wording of
the Sue and Labor Clause, the wording of an Ensuing Loss Clause is
confusing and contradictory when read together with an anticoncurrent causation exclusion. In addition, unlike the Sue and Labor
Clause, there is a lack of consensus among courts regarding its meaning
and application.
D. The Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion
The final candidate for contractual black hole status is the Sudden
and Accidental Pollution Exclusion that ISO used in its CGL policy
form between 1973 and 1986 and was frequently litigated during the
1990s. The exclusion is worth discussing here, not because the language
in the exclusion has lost its meaning due to decades of rote reuse, but
rather, as an example of the dynamic that can lead to the creation of
insurance contractual black holes.
As discussed in Part II.A, after insurers changed the CGL policy
form from accident-based to occurrence-based in the 1960s, CGL
policies unquestionably covered injuries that resulted from ongoing
injury-causing processes, as opposed to just accidental “events.”79
Consequently, environmental damage claims were covered so long as
they were unexpected and unintended:
The standard, occurrence-based policy thus covered property damage
resulting from gradual pollution. So long as the ultimate loss was
neither expected nor intended, courts generally extended coverage to
all pollution-related damage, even if it arose from the intentional
discharge of pollutants.80

Indeed, when insurers changed the CGL policy form from
accident-based to occurrence-based in the 1960s, insurers actually
marketed the new policies as covering gradual injury-causing situations

78. Compare Roberts, 705 P.2d at 1337, with Swire Pac. Holdings, 845 So. 2d at 166.
79. See supra Part II.A.
80. New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir. 1991),
abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991).
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such as pollution so long as the injury was not expected or intended by
the policyholder.81
For example, in 1965, Gilbert Bean, a former executive of a major
insurer and a member of a committee that was responsible for
reviewing and drafting policy language, stated the following with
respect to whether the new CGL policy form covered environmental
claims: “Manufacturing risks producing insecticides, plant foods,
fertilizers, weed killers, paints, chemicals, thermostats or other
regulatory devices, to name a few, have created gradual [property
damage] exposure. They need this protection and should legitimately
expect to be able to buy it, so we have included it.”82 A year later in
1966, Mr. Bean similarly wrote: “[There is] coverage for gradual
[bodily injury] or gradual [property damage] resulting over a period of
time from exposure to the insured’s waste disposal. Examples would
be gradual adverse effect of smoke, fumes, air or stream pollution,
contamination of water supply or vegetation.”83
One contemporaneous insurance policy manual that was used to
explain the coverage provided under the CGL policy form had the
following hypothetical as an example of an “occurrence” that would be
covered under the new occurrence-based policy form:
Wilson Chemical Company, the Named Insured, Occupies the
Second Floor of a Commercial Building Owned by West End
Cleaners. The West End Operation Occupies the Entire First Floor.
Wilson Chemical used Acid as a raw material. The acid is stored in
100 gallon drums on the second floor. One storage drum developed a
leak allowing acid to drip onto the floor. This eventually caused
extensive damage to several structural supports of the building and
caused a partial collapse which destroyed much of West End’s
81. See, e.g., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W. 2d 570, 574 (Wis. 1990) (“At least with
respect to environmental claims, contemporaneous industry commentary on the 1966 CGL policy
indicates that there was no intent to avoid coverage for unexpected or unintended pollution.”);
Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 849–71 (N.J. 1993) (discussing
the evidence, commentators’ views, and case law regarding coverage for environmental injuries
under the 1966 CGL policy form); see also Thomas Reiter, David Strasser & William Pohlman,
The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying The Course, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1191–93
(1991) (discussing coverage for environmental claims under occurrence-based CGL policies and
the history of insurers’ positions regarding such coverage).
82. Robert Saylor & David Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and the Intent of the CGL Drafters:
The Effect of Living Backwards, 1 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. (INS.) 4425, 4432 (1987) (quoting
Gilbert Bean, New Comprehensive General and Automobile Program, The Effect on
Manufacturing Risks, presented at Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov. 15–18, 1965)).
83. Id. at 4438 n.34 (1987) (quoting Gilbert Bean, Summary of Broadened Coverage Under
New CGL Policies With Necessary Limitation To Make This Broadening Possible (1966)).
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equipment. West End Cleaners Brought a suit against Wilson
Chemical for the replacement of their equipment. Would Wilson’s
CGL Policy Pay?
Yes. This situation would meet the second part of the definition of
occurrence, as the slow leak of acid constitutes a continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions.84

For at least two reasons, the insurers’ appetite for covering
environmental claims quickly waned. First, several significant
environmental incidents, such as the Torrey Canyon disaster and the
Santa Barbara offshore oil spill, created widespread, negative media
coverage regarding pollution.85 Second, in 1970, Congress passed the
Federal Water Quality Improvement Act, which imposed strict liability
for certain discharges into bodies of water.86 Thus, widespread negative
media attention targeted polluters, and the law began imposing strict
liability for certain environmental injuries.
In response to these developments, insurers drafted what is now
known as the qualified pollution exclusion or Sudden and Accidental
Pollution Exclusion, which first was used as a policy add-on
endorsement in 1970 and then became part of the CGL policy form
itself in 1973.87 The Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion is
worded as follows:
This insurance does not apply: . . . (f) to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants
into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of

84. Stempel, Assessing The Coverage Carnage, supra note 35, at 372 (quoting [ANONYMOUS
INSURER], THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY WORKBOOK 11–12 (1973)).
85. See, e.g., Warren Brockmeier, Pollution—The Risk and Insurance Problem, 12 FOR DEF.
77, 77–78 (1971) (discussing changes to CGL coverage after environmental disasters in the 1960s);
James Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 553
(1980) (“Pollution claims burst on the insurance scene following the Torrey Canyon disaster and
the Santa Barbara off-shore drilling oil spills in 1969.”).
86. Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1161)
(superseded by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2, Pub. L. No. 92500, 88 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012))).
87. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1196–1200; Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL
00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in
MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 366.
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water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.88

In general, under this exclusion, claims related to environmental
damage are not covered unless the event giving rise to the damage was
“sudden and accidental.”
The use of the phrase “sudden and accidental” in the exclusion is
an example of rote reuse of boilerplate language in standardized
insurance policies. The phrase previously had been used in Boiler and
Machinery insurance policies and had a judicially established meaning:
“courts uniformly had construed the phrase to mean unexpected and
unintended.”89 Thus, when the phrase was transplanted to CGL
policies in the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion, it already
was understood to mean “unexpected and unintended” in the
insurance context.
In sum, when the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion was
created, the definition of “occurrence” already limited coverage to
injuries or damage that were “neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured”90 and the phrase “sudden and accidental”
was understood to mean unexpected and unintended. Consequently,
when seeking approval of the new exclusion, it is unsurprising that
insurers told state insurance commissioners across the country that the
new exclusion was not a reduction in coverage for pollution claims, but
rather, was only a “clarification” of the coverage provided under CGL
policies.91 For example, in a June 10, 1970 letter to the Georgia State
Insurance Commissioner, the insurance industry stated:
[T]he impact of the [pollution exclusion clause] on the vast majority
of risks would be no change. It is rather a situation of clarification. . . .
Coverage for expected or intended pollution and contamination is not
88. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 366.
89. New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir. 1991),
abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991); see STEVEN
PLITT ET AL., 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 150:30 (3d ed. 2017) (“When coverage is limited to
a sudden ‘breaking’ of machinery, the word ‘sudden’ should be given its primary meaning as a
happening without previous notice or as something coming or occurring unexpectedly as
unforeseen or unprepared for. That is, ‘sudden’ is not to be construed as synonymous with
instantaneous.”)).
90. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1200–05 (discussing the insurance industry’s
representations regarding the scope of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion); Morton
Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 848–53 (N.J. 1993) (same); Joy Techs.,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 498–99 (W. Va. 1992) (same).
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now present as it is excluded by the definition of occurrence.
Coverage for accidental mishaps is continued. . . .92

As a mere “clarification” regarding the existing scope of coverage
provided under CGL policies for pollution claims, insurers did not
provide a reduction in premiums in exchange for the addition of the
new exclusion.93
The insurers’ position regarding the meaning of “sudden and
accidental” changed, however, when they were confronted with
countless lawsuits with hundreds of billions of dollars at stake in
widespread environmental insurance coverage litigation in the 1980s
and 1990s.94 The onslaught of environmental insurance coverage
litigation occurred because the landscape regarding liability for
environmental claims dramatically changed within a few years of the
addition of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion to CGL
policies.
In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).95 In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was passed
and, in 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) was passed (collectively, these environmental statutes are
known as the “Superfund” laws).96 The Superfund laws imposed
retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability for the cleanup of
environmental injuries on a variety of entities: (1) the current owners
and operators of disposal facilities, (2) the owners or operators of
disposal facilities during the time of the disposal, (3) the entities that
arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous materials, and (4)
the transporters of hazardous materials.97 These new environmental
laws created hundreds of billions of dollars of liabilities for

92. Morton, 629 A.2d at 853 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Claussen v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1987)).
93. See, e.g., id. at 848, 853; Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1202.
94. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1171 (noting that the estimated industry liability
for the environmental cleanup was $150 billion to $700 billion).
95. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334;
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (current
versions of both amendments can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012)).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
97. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA’s
retroactive and joint and several liability); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506
(6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060, 1062 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (discussing CERCLA’s imposition of strict, and joint and several liability).
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policyholders almost overnight.98 Policyholders, in turn, demanded
that their CGL insurers pay such liabilities.
When faced with a bill for hundreds of billions of dollars, insurers
took the position that the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion
unambiguously precluded coverage for any and all environmental
liabilities unless such liabilities resulted from “abrupt” releases of
contaminants.99 Because the strict liability version of contra
proferentem that often applies in insurance disputes means insurers
lose if the policy language at issue is ambiguous, the law essentially
forced insurers to take the position that the exclusion was
unambiguous.100 As a corollary to that maxim, insurers also refused to
produce any documents or allow discovery regarding the original
drafters’ intent regarding the meaning of the exclusion because
extrinsic evidence should not be relevant or discoverable if the policy
language was unambiguous.101
Policyholders, on the other hand, disputed that “sudden”
unambiguously means “abrupt” by pointing out that “sudden” also can
mean “unexpected.”102 Policyholders then requested documents from
state insurance commissioners and successfully moved to compel the
production of the drafting history from ISO and insurers regarding the
exclusion to see whether the insurers’ litigation position was consistent
with: 1) the original intent and purpose of the exclusion, and 2)
insurers’ statements to state insurance commissioners regarding the
exclusion.103 Of course, once obtained, the actual historic record
98. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1171.
99. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 45, 52 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1995) (“[Insurers] argue the term ‘sudden’ in the exception to the pollution exclusion has a
temporal meaning synonymous with ‘abrupt’ . . . .”); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.
of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 852 (N.J. 1993) (noting that insurers’ position was that CGL policies only
covered pollution if the releases causing the pollution were abrupt); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic
Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 1996) (stating that insurers contend “sudden incorporates a
temporal element”); Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1174 (noting that insurers generally argue that
“sudden” means “abrupt” or “happening quickly”).
100. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,711 A.2d at 54 (noting that the policyholder
only obtained drafting history documents regarding the Sudden and Accidental Pollution
Exclusion after successfully moving to compel their production).
102. See, e.g., id. at 52 (“DuPont argues the term ‘sudden’ is ambiguous, and the [c]ourt should
interpret ‘sudden’ to mean ‘unexpected.’”); Sinclair Oil Corp., 929 P.2d at 538 (stating that the
policyholder “contends the term is ambiguous because although sudden can mean ‘abrupt’ or
‘happening quickly’ it can also mean ‘unexpected’”).
103. See, e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 623 A.2d
1128, 1130 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (“ISO produced approximately 250,000 to 275,000 pages of
responsive documents, which had been previously collected for production by ISO and contained
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regarding the origins of the exclusion belied the insurers’ litigation
position that the term “sudden” in the Sudden and Accidental
Pollution Exclusion exclusively and unequivocally means “abrupt.”104
The story of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion is an
exemplar regarding the formula for the creation of contractual black
holes. First, information regarding the original intent and purpose of a
phrase is lost through concealment or the passage of time. Then, the
drafters of the contractual language—ISO in this instance—elect not
to revise the language despite a patent or latent ambiguity in the
language. Indeed, ISO continued to decline to revise the Sudden and
Accidental Pollution Exclusion for over a decade while numerous
courts construed the exclusion in completely inconsistent ways.105 ISO
finally changed the language in the exclusion after the insurers’
litigation position regarding the meaning of the language had been
rejected by numerous courts and insurers had been held liable for
billions of dollars associated with environmental cleanups.106

material related to the development of CGL language prior to March of 1983 and pollution
coverage and exclusion language prior to December 1985.”); Morton, 629 A.2d at 848–53
(discussing the documentation regarding insurers’ statements to state insurance commissioners
about the regulatory approval of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion); Joy Techs.,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 498–99 (W. Va. 1992) (same).
104. See, e.g., Morton, 629 A.2d at 875 (applying regulatory estoppel to prevent the insurers
from taking a position regarding the meaning of “sudden and accidental” that was inconsistent
with their representations to state insurance commissioners); Joy, 421 S.E.2d at 500 (same).
105. Compare Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (en banc)
(“Although ‘sudden’ can reasonably be defined to mean abrupt or immediate, it can also
reasonably be defined to mean unexpected and unintended. Since the term ‘sudden’ is susceptible
to more than one reasonable definition, the term is ambiguous, and we therefore construe the
phrase . . . against the insurer . . . .”), and Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 690
(Ga. 1989) (“In sum, we conclude that the pollution exclusion clause is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation. The clause must therefore be construed in favor of the insured to mean
‘unexpected and unintended.’”), with Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Grp., Inc., 659 A.2d
1295, 1308 (Md. 1995) (“We agree with the interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause
adopted in numerous other cases. . . . Under those interpretations, the language of such an
exclusion provides coverage only for pollution which is both sudden and accidental. It does not
apply to gradual pollution. . . .”), and Upjohn Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich.
1991) (“We find persuasive the recent opinions . . . which find the terms of the pollution exclusion
to be unambiguous. We conclude that when considered in its plain and easily understood sense,
‘sudden’ is defined with a ‘temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and
the unexpected.’” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
106. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1986), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 374
(reflecting the change from the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion to the Absolute
Pollution Exclusion in ISO’s 1986 CGL policy form); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note
61, at 1896–1900 (citing decisions in 14 states where courts rejected the insurers’ litigation position
regarding the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and
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Ultimately, the massive litigation regarding the Sudden and
Accidental Pollution Exclusion prevented the exclusion from
becoming a contractual black hole because the insurers’ position
regarding the origin and meaning of the language in the exclusion was
proven to be inconsistent with reality. The result, however, could have
been completely different. The exclusion could have become another
contractual black hole through rote reuse of language and the passage
of time. It did not, however, because the litigation regarding the
meaning of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion occurred
fairly soon after the exclusion was drafted. In addition, the
policyholders had the resources and tenacity to force the insurance
industry to produce the documentation regarding the original intent
and meaning of the exclusion.
CONCLUSION
The potential for contractual black holes to appear in standardized
commercial contracts is real. Insurance policies are fertile ground for
the creation of contractual black holes. Many policies are drafted by a
centralized organization—ISO—and the policy language is reused by
rote decade after decade. As non-drafters of the policy language, the
insurers that use the ISO policy forms often do not even know what the
policy language means themselves.
The rote reuse of policy language then becomes a selfperpetuating cycle because a strict liability version of contra
proferentem often applies in insurance disputes. This dictates that
insurers always take the position that policy language is unambiguous.
Consequently, there is a disincentive for insurers to revise policy
language because any changes to it could be viewed as an admission
that the old language was ambiguous. Over time, as the policy language
becomes antiquated and begins to lose meaning, it is reused
nonetheless.
This dynamic, combined with the increasingly complex structure
and organization of policies, has resulted in policies, as a whole or in
part, appearing to be contractual black holes. An examination of the

Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its
Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1998) (“Responding to the flurry of
environmental litigation over the application of the “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion,
the insurance industry during the mid-1980s largely adopted new standard pollution exclusion
language for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. Since the mid-1980s, the standard form
CGL has included the so-called absolute pollution exclusion. . . .” (footnote omitted)).

FRENCH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

64

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

11/12/2017 4:31 PM

[Vol. 67:40

Non-Cumulation Clause, Sue and Labor Clause, Ensuing Loss Clause,
and the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion demonstrates that
some policy provisions have become contractual black holes, some
provisions are only apparent contractual black holes, and some
provisions were saved before they became black holes.

